The Effect of Feedback on News Verification Demand: Experimental Evidence
Presentation, Job Market Practice Talk, Santa Barbara, CA.
I presented this paper in the Department of Economics at UCSB.
Talks and presentations
Behavioral Biases on Misinformation
Presentation, ESA North America Meeting, Columbus, Ohio
This project contributes experimental evidence to the discussion of how to increase fact-checking by analyzing how overconfidence and motivated reasoning affect the willingness to pay to verify whether a headline is correct. Making available the alternative of perfect verification experimentally allows us to abstract from a specific fact-checking strategy (some of them more effective and accepted than others) and focus on the potential impact of behavioral biases on the demand for fact-checking.
¿Cuánto pagar por descubrir?
Presentation, Auditorio Florente Lopez, UNAM
You can see the presentation (in Spanish) here.
¿Cuándo verificamos las noticas?
Presentation, Online, Seminario de Investigación en Ciencias del Comportamiento
You can see the presentation (in Spanish) here.
Do Others Believe the Same? Experimental Analysis of Higher-Order Learning and WTP for Information
Presentation, ESA North America Meeting, Charlotte, NC.
This research explores whether agents consider others’ biases in their belief updating when priors are known to be different and how information acquisition depends on whose strategy is implemented. The strategy method is implemented in a bookbag-and-poker-chip experiment to elicit first and second-order posterior beliefs, and the BDM mechanism is used to elicit their WTP to implement their or others’ strategy. The deviations from Bayes’s rule found were consistent with previous literature. On average, participants expect others to have the same posterior beliefs independently if they share a common prior or not. However, the presence of heterogeneous priors increases the distance between posterior beliefs and the expectations about others. Finally, it is shown that participants exhibit a larger willingness to pay for information when they implement their strategy rather than the strategy of another participant, which contradicts strategic thinking.
Biased Beliefs with Heterogeneous Priors
Presentation, North Hall 1112, UCSB
This research explores experimentally whether information acquisition depends on whose strategy is implemented in a Bayesian learning task. In the first section of the experiment, I measured the deviation from Bayes’ rule for each participant and their expected posterior from other participants. In the second section, I elicit the willingness to pay to get a new signal and implement a rule based on their posterior beliefs. On average, participants expect others to have the same posterior beliefs. Finally, it is shown that participants exhibit a larger willingness to pay for a signal realization when they implement their strategy rather than the strategy of another participant. This results contribute to the literature on preferences for decision rights and delegation, as well as strategic uncertainty.
Learning your own risk aversion
Presentation, ESA North America Meeting, Santa Barbara, CA.
I presented this paper in the ESA NAM 2023.